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Abstract
This article contributes new time series for studying the UK economy during World War I and the
interwar period. The time series are per capita hours worked and average capital income, labor income,
and consumption tax rates. Uninterrupted time series of these variables are provided for an annual
sample that runs from 1913 to 1938. We highlight the usefulness of these time series with several
empirical applications. The per capita hours worked data are used in a growth accounting exercise to
measure the contributions of capital, labor, and productivity to output growth. The average tax rates
are employed in a Bayesian model averaging experiment to reevaluate the Benjamin and Kochin (1979)
regression.
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Macroeconomics arguably exists as a ﬁeld of economics because the UK suﬀered two depres-
sions between the world wars. Keynes (1964, pp. 2–3) acknowledges that The General Theory is his
response to interwar UK economic outcomes and policies. Critiques of Keynesian as well as non-
Keynesian theories of the interwar UK economy are plentiful. Unfortunately, researchers are often
constrained from applying modern quantitative methods to evaluate these theories because the neces-
sary time series either do not exist or are corrupted by missing observations.
This paper aims to relax the data constraint by contributing previously unavailable UK ﬁscal
and labor market time series for an annual sample beginning in 1913 and ending with 1938. The
ﬁscal variables are ex post average capital income, labor income, and consumption tax rates. The labor
market variable is per capita hour worked. Table 1 lists these time series.
The ﬁrst part of the paper discusses data sources, tabulation methods, and additional assump-
tions used to tabulate UK ex post average tax rates and per capita hours worked time series. Computing
ex post average tax rates involves dividing capital income, labor income, and consumption tax revenue
by capital income, labor income, and consumption expenditures, respectively. Feinstein (1972) and
Mitchell (1988) contain these data in one way or another for the entire 1913–1938 sample.
In contrast, aggregate UK labor market data are missing in the 1913–1938 sample. These data
are needed to construct UK per capita hours worked. A key source for UK aggregate labor market
data is Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982), but they report aggregate hours worked only for
1913, 1924, and 1937. We ﬁll in missing observations from 1914 to 1923 by accounting for a long-run
decline in hours worked during this period; see Clapham (1932), Dowie (1975), and Matthews, Feinstein,
and Odling-Smee (1982). Between 1924 and 1938, an uninterrupted per capita hours worked series is
computed by adopting the ﬁxed annual change in hours worked assumption of Cole and Ohanian
(2002a). The resulting series runs uninterrupted from 1913 to 1938. This is our preferred measure of
per capita hours worked that is reported in table 1.
Table 1 also reports an alternative per capita hours worked series. We gauge the robustness of
the assumptions used in calculating our preferred per capita hours worked measure with this alterna-
tive. Our preferred and alternative per capita hours worked series are identical before 1920. From 1920
to 1938, the alternative per capita hours worked series is derived from indices of ‘normal weekly hours’
taken from the Ministry of Labour Gazette (September 1957) and the 1924 and 1937 aggregate hours
1worked observations of Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982). Thus, diﬀerences in these series
between 1920 and 1938 reﬂect assumptions employed in their construction. However, these dispari-
ties appear not to be substantial because moments of our preferred and alternative per capita hours
worked series are nearly identical whether computed on a 1916–1938 sample, the interwar 1920–1938
sample, or a shorter 1925–1938 interwar sample.
The average tax rate and per capita hours worked time series ﬁll in gaps that have inhibited
using time series econometrics, calibration tools, and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models to study UK ﬁscal policy and labor markets whether on the interwar period, 1920–1938; the
‘transwar’ years, 1913–1924; or a 1916–1938 sample. For example, we engage unit root tests to describe
average tax rate persistence. The tests indicate that average capital income and consumption tax rates
are observationally equivalent to unit root processes on a 1916–1938 sample, but the average labor
income tax rate is not. Although Bizer and Durlauf (1990) and Hess (1993), among others, assess the
optimality of ﬁscal policy with unit root tests of tax rates, Scott (2007) shows that these tests are
insuﬃcient to judge this hypothesis.
Nason and Vahey (2007) give context for unit root tests of the average tax rates. Their analysis
shows that the UK moved to a ﬁscal policy regime, the McKenna rule, in 1916 that was a commitment
to smooth the paths of government debt and debt retirement. The evidence is that the UK remained
committed to the McKenna rule during the transition from World War I to the peacetime of the 1920s
and that this commitment continued into the 1930s. Given the commitment to smooth debt during
the life of the McKenna rule, a tax rate has to act as the ﬁscal buﬀer to close the UK government
budget constraint. Capital income taxation played this role according to Nason and Vahey (2007). The
persistence of the average capital income tax rate, along with this tax rate’s level and volatility, are
consistent with Nason and Vahey’s view of UK ﬁscal policy from 1916 to 1938.
Next, we present an application to exploit the uninterrupted per capita hours worked times
series. Our preferred measure of per capita hours worked is used in a growth accounting exercise to
construct UK total factor productivity (TFP) from 1916 to 1938. Labor input is measured with total
hours worked, which equals per capita hours worked multiplied by the employment rate. The growth
accounting exercise ﬁnds that TFP growth is constant across 1916–1938 and interwar samples. There
is also little change in the average growth rate of the capital stock across these samples. In contrast, the
average growth rate of total hours worked is negative on the 1916–1938 sample and only turns positive
when observations from 1916 to 1924 are excluded. Average output growth is positive on 1916–1938,
21920–1938, and 1925–1938 samples. The latter sample yields the greatest average output growth.
Thus, our growth accounting exercise generates evidence that is consistent with earlier accounts by
Bienefeld (1972), Dowie (1975), Broadberry (1986, 1990), and more recently Cole and Ohanian (2002a)
that focus on the labor market to explain the poor performance of the interwar UK economy. However,
the uninterrupted per capita hours worked time series is necessary to discover that the drop in output
following World War I coincided with negative labor input growth and that the expansion of the 1920s
occurred at the same time labor input growth turned positive.
The usefulness of the average tax rate data is displayed in an application that revisits the
Benjamin and Kochin (1979) regression. Benjamin and Kochin (BK) estimate a regression to test their
hypothesis that larger unemployment beneﬁts contributed to a higher UK unemployment rate during
the interwar period. Although many questions have been raised about the speciﬁcation of the BK
regression, this regression has not been subjected to a Bayesian model evaluation. We employ Bayesian
model averaging (BMA) methods to quantify uncertainty surrounding the BK estimates of the response
of the UK unemployment rate to the ratio of unemployment beneﬁts to wages, the replacement ratio,
for 1916–1938 and 1920–1938 samples. The BMA exercises quantify this uncertainty by enlarging the
space of the BK regression model with speciﬁcations that add diﬀerent combinations of the average
tax rates. The average tax rates represent uncertainty in the regressors that explain variation in the UK
unemployment rate conditional on the estimation samples. Given these samples, the BMA exercises
reveal that the BK estimates of the response of the UK unemployment rate to the replacement ratio are
fragile, especially with respect to the average capital income tax rate.
The paper follows this order. Section 2 describes our contributions to the World War I and
interwar UK time series. We present two applications in section 3 that use the per capita hours worked
and average tax rate data. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. UK Average Tax Rates and Per Capita Hours Worked, 1913–38
This section describes the construction of UK average capital income, labor income, and con-
sumption tax rates and per capita hours worked. The data are sampled at an annual frequency. The
sample begins in 1913 and ends with 1938.1 We conduct some preliminary analyses of these time
series to close this section, which draw attention to the importance of understanding the data prior
and subsequent to 1920.
1The sample period covers Irish independence from the UK. We follow conventions established by Feinstein (1972) and
Mitchell (1988) that exclude Eire’s contribution to post-1919 data.
32.1 Average Tax Rates During World War I and the Interwar Period
Table 1 lists ex post average capital income, labor income, and consumption tax rates from
1913 to 1938. These tax rates are plotted in ﬁgure 1. The focus is on ex post average tax rates because
ex ante and ex post UK marginal tax rates are unavailable for this sample. Our approach to computing
ex post average tax rates follows Cooley and Ohanian (1997). They compile ex post annual average UK
tax rates for World War II and its post-war period by dividing revenue of a tax source by the related
income or expenditure series.
Feinstein (1972) and Mitchell (1988) are the primary sources for the data used to compute the
average tax rates. We discuss the numerator and denominator of an average tax rate separately to
be explicit about its construction.2 Average tax rates are reported on a calendar year (CY) basis. We
convert from the ﬁscal year (FY) to the CY with CYt  0:25FYt  0:75FYt1.
The average capital income tax rate is the ratio of capital income tax revenue to capital income.
Mitchell (1988) is the source of pre-1920 capital income and capital income tax revenue. Capital income
tax revenue includes death duties found in Mitchell (pp. 583–584) from 1913 to 1919. By 1913, death
duties were already a “long-established method” of capital taxation in the UK; see Daunton (2002, p.
212).3 Pre-1920 capital income is gross trading proﬁts from Mitchell (pp. 829–830). This income is
about 60 percent of total corporate income post-1919. The ratio of pre-1920 capital income tax revenue
to pre-1920 capital income is the average capital income tax rate, K;t, from 1913 to 1919.4
Feinstein (1972) lacks capital income tax revenue and income before 1920 but has these data
for the interwar period.5 From 1920 to 1938, capital income tax revenue is the sum of taxes levied
on corporate income plus other taxes paid by capital, including death duties. These data are provided
by Feinstein (T77 and T79, respectively).6 Capital income is matched to corporate income post-1919,
which is also found in Feinstein (T77). We splice pre-1920 K;t to the 1920–1938 ratio of capital tax
revenue to capital income to generate K;t for the 1913–1938 sample.
Calculation of K;t excludes revenue generated by the Excess Proﬁt Duty (EPD). The budget of
September 1915 includes an announcement that the EPD would be implemented in 1916. The EPD is a
unique part of the UK’s World War I ﬁscal policy regime, which is known as the McKenna rule for the
2The numerators and denominators are in nominal terms (i.e., current year pounds).
3Death duties fell on personal property from the late 1880s to the 1930s; see Daunton (2002, p. 8).
4Table 1 of Arnold (1999) contains indices of proﬁts in current prices from 1889 to 1924. The third column of table 1 lists
an index that matches our concept of capital income taken from Mitchell (1988) and Feinstein (1972).
5The ‘List of Table’ in Feinstein (1972) is preﬁxed by T.
6Death duties are on average about 50 percent of capital tax revenue from 1920 to 1938, but this ratio rises from less than
50 percent in the early 1920s to around 60 percent by 1938.
4then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna. Citing Daunton (2002) among others, Nason and
Vahey (2007) present evidence that the McKenna rule regime operated from 1916 to 1938.7
The McKenna rule consists of several pieces. Among the most important features are a com-
mitment to smooth a state-contingent path of debt and debt retirement subsequent to the end of
World War I, year-by-year budget balance on nondefense expenditures, and use of the EPD to prevent
excess ‘war proﬁts’.8 In McKenna’s September 1915 budget, EPD revenue is generated by conﬁscating
50 percent of a covered ﬁrm’s proﬁts, net of labor costs and investment, that is in excess of average
1912–1913 proﬁts plus £100. According to this scheme, EPD revenue equals net proﬁts multiplied by
the EPD statutory rate. This revenue stream is the numerator of the average EPD rate, EPD;t. The
denominators of EPD;t and K;t are equivalent, which permits aggregation of these tax rates. As pre-
viously noted, the EPD was 50 percent initially, but it was raised to 60 percent in McKenna’s budget of
late 1916 and to 80 percent by Bonar Law in his 1918 budget. The 1919 budget of Austen Chamberlain
lowered the EPD with the end of World War I as the McKenna rule mandated. However, the EPD was
not abolished by legislation until 1921.
The UK war budgets of 1916–1918 lean heavily on the EPD. It contributes 24, 30, and 32 percent
of government revenue in 1916, 1917, and 1918, respectively. Although summing EPD;t and K;t gives
an indication of the total capital tax eﬀort, these taxes created diﬀerent economic incentives for ﬁrms
and households during World War I and the immediate post-war years that suggest it is reasonable to
treat the two tax rates as distinct. This helps for comparing EPD;t and K;t to the average labor income
and consumption tax rates. We include EPD;t in table 1 and ﬁgure 2 to enable these comparisons.9
The average labor income tax rate is straightforward to compute from available revenue and
tax base data. Feinstein (1972, T5–6) provides employment income, which is identiﬁed as the labor
income tax base. Labor income tax revenue is the income tax revenue series of Feinstein (T31–32),
subsequent to netting for EPD, and corporate tax revenue that is also found in Feinstein (T31–32). The
ratio of labor tax revenue to labor income equals the average labor income tax rate, N;t.
7Nason and Vahey (2007) use a permanent income model to show the McKenna rule’s detrimental eﬀect on the UK economy.
8The McKenna rule intended for the UK ﬁscal authority to employ the EPD only for the duration of World War I; see Daunton
(2002, pp. 55–57). He argues that policymakers viewed the EPD as a device to mitigate war proﬁts and monopolistic rents
thought to be caused by temporary excess demand during World War I.
9Although the EPD was eliminated in 1921, table 1 and ﬁgure 2 show EPD;t falling to zero from 1922 to 1927. The reason
is that we add to the EPD the revenue from a corporate proﬁts tax that was introduced in the 1920 budget; see Daunton
(2002, p. 91). This tax was part of the transition from the EPD to peacetime capital income taxation. The 1920 budget set the
corporate proﬁts tax rate at 5 percent. Mitchell (1988, p. 586) reports that the corporate proﬁts tax raised £17.6 million in
1922. This was less than 60 percent of the £30.5 million generated by the EPD in 1922, which was the last year of the EPD.
The 1924 budget eliminated the corporate proﬁts tax, but only after its rate was cut in half by the 1923 budget; see Daunton
(pp. 92–93). The corporate proﬁts tax provided the Treasury with a shrinking revenue stream through 1927.
5A similar ratio deﬁnes the average consumption tax rate, C;t. Its numerator is expenditure
tax revenue that is composed of customs and other duties and post oﬃce, telephone, telegraph, and
motor vehicle excise taxes from Mitchell (1988, pp. 583–584). The consumption tax base is household
goods and services expenditures as listed in Mitchell (pp. 833–834).
We plot K;t, N;t, C;t, and EPD;t from 1913 to 1938 in ﬁgure 1. In this ﬁgure, the average
tax rates are denoted K;t, N;t, C;t, and EPD;t with a solid (red) line, dashed (green) line, dot-dash
(brown) line, and solid (gray) line with circles, respectively.
UK ﬁscal policy holds K;t, N;t, and C;t almost equal between 1913 and 1915, according to
table 1 and ﬁgure 1. However, N;t, and C;t rise slightly in 1915. These changes in average tax rates
are the product of the initial World War I budgets for the UK that attempted to maintain ‘business as
usual’ and not disadvantage any interest or class; Daunton (2002, pp. 38–40 and p. 55).
Higher levies are placed on proﬁts and to a lesser extent labor income beginning in 1916. Table
1 reports that EPD;1916  13.1 percent, which is almost double the next largest average tax rate, N;t,
in that year. Subsequently,EPD;t falls to about 15 percent in 1921 before becoming negligible by the
mid-1920s, which is also seen in ﬁgure 1.
The inclination to tax capital more than labor income or consumption remains a cornerstone
of UK ﬁscal policy during the interwar years. The EPD is supplanted by direct capital income taxation
in 1921. Table 1 shows that K;t reached 26.4 percent in 1921 from just 3 percent in 1918.10 The
sharp rise in the average capital income tax rate in the early 1920s is consistent with after-tax real
returns on capital reported in Arnold (1999).11 Thus, the average capital tax rate is a reliable guide to
the pressures the McKenna rule exerted on capital in the UK during the ‘transwar’ period. Figure 1 also
depicts the shift to K;t from EPD;t in the early 1920s. Although K;t falls to 14 percent in 1937, it
stays above N;t and C;t by 4.5 percentage points or more from 1921 to 1938.
Figure 1 displays a steady rise in C;t from 1924 to 1938. Compare this to the volatility of N;t
during the same years. Steady growth in C;t is suﬃcient for it to equal or exceed N;t by the mid-
1930s. Nonetheless, ﬁgure 1 depicts larger (positive) spikes in K;t around the economic downturns
of the early 1920s and early 1930s than observed for N;t and C;t in ﬁgure 1. This volatility suggests
that capital income taxation was an important tool of UK ﬁscal policy during the interwar period.
10The 1921 spike in K;t would be even more striking without the contribution death duties make to UK capital income tax
revenue before 1920. However, there are measurement issues inherent in tying capital taxation to death duties from 1913 to
1919 because it may create a positive bias in K;t, induced, for example, by confounding stocks with ﬂows.
11The after-tax real return on capital falls from an average of 14.5 percent during 1915–1919 to 5.4 percent for 1920–1924;
Arnold (1999; p. 58).
62.2 Working in War and Peace: Per Capita Hours Worked
Despite the attention paid to UK labor markets of the interwar years, little is known about hours
worked in this period, as well as during World War I. The default sources of UK historical statistics,
Feinstein (1972) and Mitchell (1988), lack uninterrupted aggregate hours worked data from 1913 to
1938. Instead, Mitchell (1988) references appendix D of Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982)
which gives annual aggregate hours worked observations only for 1913, 1924, and 1937.
This paper ﬁlls in the missing hours worked observations for 1914–1923, 1925–1936, and
1938. An uninterrupted 1913–1938 per capita hours worked time series is constructed by drawing on
Clapham (1932) and Dowie (1975), as well as Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982), Feinstein
(1972), and Mitchell (1988). Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982) report average hours worked
per worker of 2,753, 2,219, and 2,293 for 1913, 1924, and 1937, respectively; also see Mitchell (1988,
p. 147). Nonetheless, Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (pp. 71–72) argue that their 1913 ﬁgure
of 2,753 average hours worked per worker is too high. They refer to an estimate by Clapham (pp.
477–479) that the average annual reduction in hours worked is in the range of 2.5 to 5 percent from
1880 to 1914. We calibrate 1913 per capita hours worked to the midpoint of Clapham’s range, which
lowers this observation to 2,641 from 2,753 average hours worked per worker.
Two additional adjustments are needed to produce hours worked observations between 1913
and 1924. Evidence is presented by Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982) that during this
period 10 to 20 percent of the decrease in hours worked was generated by a gradual change in the
composition of employment across occupational and industrial sectors. We adopt the midpoint of this
range. Given this assumption, it is straightforward to apportion 15 percent of the accumulated loss in
hours worked in equal amounts to each of the 11 years between 1913 and 1924.
Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982) and Dowie (1975) report that hours worked fell in
1919. According to Dowie, ﬁrms began to shorten the morning shift by one hour beginning in January
1919. He ﬁnds that these changes were implemented by July 1919. Given this evidence, we attribute
to 1919 the remaining 85 percent fall in hours worked that occurred between 1913 and 1924. This
implies that in 1919 the average employee lost 359 [ 0.85  (2641   2219)] hours of work plus the
ﬁxed amount equally allotted to all years from 1913 to 1924. We calculate the ﬁxed annual drop in
hours worked per worker by adding the 1919 loss of 359 hours to the 1924 observation of 2,219 hours,
subtracting this amount from the adjusted 1913 observation of 2,641 hours, and dividing by 11. These
calculations lower hours worked per worker by 5.73 hours per year between 1913 and 1924.
7Hours worked are constructed for the rest of the sample by following Cole and Ohanian (2002a).
They assume a constant hours worked growth rate between 1924 and 1937.12 Since dividing the dif-
ference between the 1937 aggregate hours worked observation of 2,293 and the 1924 aggregate hours
worked observation of 2,219 by 13 is 5.69 hours, we apply a constant annual increase of 5.69 hours
worked per worker to generate hours worked per worker observations from 1925 to 1938.
Two ﬁnal calculations are needed to construct an uninterrupted per capita hours worked series
from 1913 to 1938. The annual total hours worked per worker series is multiplied by the number of
UK employed civilians plus military personnel, as reported in Feinstein (1972, T126). The last step
divides this aggregate hours worked series by total population, from Feinstein (1972, T121), to produce
uninterrupted per capita hours worked.13 This is our preferred per capita hours worked series, which
is labeled ht in table 1.
We also construct an alternative per capita hours worked series to gauge the robustness of
our preferred ht. This alternative uses two indices of “normal weekly hours of manual workers in 69
principal industries and services” recovered from the Ministry of Labour Gazette (September 1957, pp.
330–331).14 The Ministry of Labour Gazette reports an index of ‘normal weekly hours’ for an annual
1920–1933 sample that has a base year of 1924 (equal to 100) and another index with a base year of 1939
that runs from 1934 to 1947. We multiply the former series by the 1924 observation of aggregate hours
worked found in Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982). This process is repeated by applying
their 1937 observation of aggregate hours worked to the second index from 1934 to 1938 making an
adjustment for its 1939 base year. The series created by these two operations are spliced together to
form a 1920-1938 sample of hours worked per week. The alternative per capita hours worked series
for this period is generated by multiplying by UK employment and dividing by UK population. Prior to
1920, our preferred and alternative per capita hours worked observations are identical. The alternative
per capita hours worked series is denoted hAlt;t.
Table 1 shows that ht and hAlt;t are remarkably similar after 1919. Our preferred per capita
hours worked series is greater than halt;t except in 1926, 1927, and 1934–1936. Further, diﬀerences
12The website http://www.greatdepressionsbook.com/datasets/UKData.xls links to the Cole and Ohanian (2002a) data set.
13Appendix A1 gives more details about UK civilian employment, military employment, and population from 1913 to 1938,
which also are listed in table A1.
14The Ministry of Labour Gazette deﬁnes ‘normal weekly hours’ as falling under working conditions established by contract,
legislation, or custom rather than actual hours worked per week; see McCormick (1959). Combining aggregate hours worked
with the indices of ‘normal weekly hours of manual workers’ assumes that the notional hours worked behavior of these workers
is a reasonable proxy for actual hours worked by UK workers not employed in the “69 principal industries and services” during
the 1920s and 1930s. If this assumption is invalid, measurement error will be induced in the alternative per capita hours
worked series.
8in ht and halt;t are small. The largest discrepancy occurs in 1932 and is about 14 hours. These series
indicate that the UK labor market was weak in 1921 and 1922. Subsequently, ht and hAlt;t expand
slowly for the rest of the 1920s, fall in 1930 and 1931, and recover from 1933 through 1937. It is only
in 1938 that the paths of ht and hAlt;t diverge.
Our uninterrupted ht and hAlt;t series suggest a puzzle for an extant explanation of the interwar
UK labor market. Table 1 shows ht dropped by more than 16 percent between 1918 and 1919, increased
by 1.8 percent in 1920, only to fall by 13.6 percent in 1921.15 The puzzle is that Benjamin and Kochin
(1979) and Cole and Ohanian (2002a) argue that more generous unemployment beneﬁts beginning in
1920 explain much of the increase in UK unemployment during the 1920s.
2.3 Unit Root Tests and Sample Statistics: 1916–1938
Table 3 contains sample statistics of K;t, N;t, and C;t on the 1916–1938 sample. Figure 1
shows that during this period K;t, N;t, and C;t appear to display substantial persistence, but K;t
exhibits much greater volatility than N;t and C;t. Before reviewing the sample statistics, we test
whether the average tax rates are stationary in levels or persistent enough to justify applying the ﬁrst
diﬀerence operator.
We report unit root tests to assess the role that persistence has in average tax rate dynamics.
The unit root tests are based on ﬁrst-order autoregressions, AR(1)s. Table 2 contains ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates of the AR(1), i;t  i  ii;t 1  i;t, for i  K;N;C, where i;t is a mean
zero, homoscedastic forecast innovation. The AR1 coeﬃcient i measures persistence. Volatility is
identiﬁed with the standard deviation of i;t, ;i, which is conditional on the AR(1) model.
The estimated AR(1)s yield a conditional volatility ranking of the average tax rates that rein-
forces a message of ﬁgure 1. The volatility of K;t dominates that of N;t, and C;t. Table 2 includes
an estimate of the standard deviation of K;t, b ;K that is more than four times larger than b ;N and
seven times larger than b ;C.
Estimates of i are more diﬃcult to interpret. One issue is that AR coeﬃcients are biased
downward in the presence of a unit root. An implication is that i has the nonstandard Dickey-Fuller
(DF) distribution; see MacKinnon (1996). We garner evidence about the unit root hypothesis for K;t,
N;t, and C;t with the DF t-ratio and the Andrews and Chen (1994) approximate median-unbiased
estimate of the AR1 coeﬃcient, MU;i. These statistics appear at the bottom of table 2.
The null of the DF t-ratio is a unit root, i  1. The alternative is that i is stationary,
  i
  < 1.
15The alternative per capita hours worked measure was 1.2 percent higher in 1920 and in 1921 also declined by 13.6 percent.
9We obtain ﬁnite-sample 1, 5, and 10 percent critical values of  3:75,  3:00, and  2:64 using software
described in MacKinnon (1996).16 Against these critical values, a unit root cannot be rejected for K;t
or C;t at standard signiﬁcance levels. The DF t-ratio of N is  3:81, which rejects the unit root null
at the 1 percent level. We infer from these tests that ÑK;t, N;t, and ÑC;t are stationary.
We report Andrews and Chen (1994) approximate median-unbiased estimates of the AR1 co-
eﬃcient, b MU;i, to measure the persistence of K;t and C;t. With b MU;C  1.02, persistence in C;t
almost matches the unit root null. The response of C;t is permanent (i.e., never decays) to an own
shock C;t at this point estimate. The estimate b MU;K  0.85 indicates that K;t is persistent, but that
its response to an own shock K;t has ﬁnite duration with a half-life of about 4 years. However, T  23
years is a short annual sample that points to uncertainty surrounding b MU;K and b MU;C. The last row









. These 90 percent conﬁdence intervals yield additional evidence that K;t and
C;t are observationally equivalent to unit root processes on the McKenna rule regime of 1916 to 1938.
Nonetheless, the lower end of these conﬁdence intervals include values that signal less persistence in
K;t and C;t.
Tax rate persistence is used to evaluate tax rate policy by Bizer and Durlauf (1990), Hess (1993),
and Scott (2007), among others. Their motivation is the tax smoothing model, which predicts optimal
policy and requires tax rates to evolve as random walks. The random walk tax rate result depends
on the tax smoothing model having incomplete markets (i.e., the government cannot issue a complete
set of Arrow-Debreu securities). Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppälä (2002) contrast the random
walk in tax rates under incomplete markets to the Ramsey tax problem faced by the social planner of
a complete markets economy that is studied by Lucas and Stokey (1983). In this case, the solution of
the Ramsey problem yields stationary tax rates.
Scott (2007) extends these results by constructing tax rate regressions that respond only to
macro variables from a complete markets dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. When
the DSGE model is restricted to having incomplete markets, the tax rate regression includes a lag of
the tax rate with a unit coeﬃcient.17 The lesson of Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppälä (2002) and
Scott (2007) is that there are limits to the inference that can be extracted from unit root tests of K;t,
N;t, and C;t. These tests are unable to disentangle the role of market complete or incompleteness
16The software is found at http://www.econ.queensu.ca/faculty/mackinnon/numdist/.
17Scott (2007) reports that OECD labor income tax rates are best described as approximating unit roots on a post-World War
II sample of OECD economies.
10from that of deviations from optimality in generating tax rate dynamics.
The unit root tests, together with ﬁgures 1 and 2, are useful for understanding a key argument
of Nason and Vahey (2007). They show that the McKenna rule committed the UK to a state-contingent
debt retirement path that forced a tax rate to adjust to close the government’s budget constraint.
Figures 1 and 2 reveal that the average capital income tax rate has greater volatility and is at a higher
level after the 1920s than either the average labor income or the consumption tax rates. The average
capital income tax rate is also more (as) persistent (as) than the average labor income (consumption) tax
rate, according to the unit root tests. This evidence suggests that the UK relied on the capital income
tax rate to be the buﬀer that was adjusted to meet the commitments of the McKenna rule.
This section closes by reviewing sample statistics of ÑK;t, N;t, ÑC;t; the growth rate of
our preferred per capita hours worked series Ñlnht; and the growth rate of the alternative measure
ÑlnhAlt;t. We report sample statistics of Ñlnht and ÑlnhAlt;t rather than levels (or log levels) because
these series contain trends by construction. Table 3 lists the sample mean X, standard deviation b X,
maximum XMax, minimum XMin, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient b X1, for X  ÑK, N,
ÑC, Ñlnh, and ÑlnhAlt;t on the 1916–1918 sample. Figure 2 plots ÑK, ÑC, Ñlnht, and ÑlnhAlt;t
with a solid (red) line, dotted (brown) line, dot-dash (green) line, and solid (purple) line with circles,
respectively, from 1914 to 1938.
There are important diﬀerences across the sample statistics of N;t compared with those of
ÑK;t and ÑC;t in table 3. On average N;t is about 10 percent, which is large relative to b N  1.3.
This is not true for ÑK=b ÑK and ÑC=b ÑC.18 There is positive serial correlation in N;t, but b N1 
0.65 indicates rapid decay in less than two years. Only weak positive ﬁrst-order serial correlation arises
in ÑK;t and ÑC;t. Finally, the row labeled b X reveals that ÑK is more volatile than N or ÑC.19
Table 3 also contains sample statistics of Ñlnht. These statistics reveal Ñlnht to be volatile and
approximately serially uncorrelated. The ﬁfth column of table 3 shows that relative to (the absolute
value of) Ñlnh, b Ñlnh is about eight times larger, ÑlnhMax equals 3 percent (in 1937), ÑlnhMin 
 16:5 percent (in 1919), and b Ñlnh1   0:05. These observations are bolstered by the plot of Ñlnht
in ﬁgure 2. However, interpreting the sample statistics of Ñlnht require caution because trends and
structural breaks are built into our preferred measure of per capita hours worked.
The statistics reported in table 3 are useful for examining the robustness of ht to the assump-
18Sample means of K;t C;t  0:162 0:079. The associated standard deviations are 0.069 and 0.015.
19Tables A2 and A3 show that a drop in volatility is the biggest impact of moving from the McKenna rule sample to the
interwar 1920–1938 and 1925–1938 samples.
11tion used in its construction with hAlt;t. The far right column of table 3 shows that ÑlnhAlt;t yields
sample statistics that are about equal to those of Ñlnht. Plots of Ñlnht and ÑlnhAlt;t, depicted in
ﬁgure 2, support the notion that the moments of these are nearly identical. The only notable diﬀerence
is that ÑlnhAlt;t has a maximum growth rate of 5.5 percent (in 1934), which is almost twice as large as
that of ÑlnhMax (in 1937).20
3. Applications
This section contains two applications. The ﬁrst is a growth accounting exercise that exploits
ht to produce an uninterrupted TFP residual from 1916 to 1938. Next, we add combinations of K;t,
N;t, and C;t to the Benjamin and Kochin (1979) regression to conduct a Bayesian evaluation of the
hypothesis that increased unemployment beneﬁts drove the UK interwar unemployment rate higher.
3.1 World War I and Interwar UK Growth Accounting
The growth accounting exercise decomposes output growth into contributions made by capital,
labor, and TFP conditional on a production function. We adopt the constant return to scale (CRS)
production technology
Yt  K
t Zt Nt1 ; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where Yt, Kt, Zt, and Nt denote output, the capital stock, labor-augmenting TFP, and labor input,
respectively. Labor input equals total hours worked, Nt  Et ht, where Et is the employment rate. We
set capital’s share, , at 0.35. The CRS production technology 1 is standard in macroeconomics. For
example, Cho and Cooley (1994) use a similar production function to study the roles that adjustment
along the extensive margin, Et, and the intensive margin, ht, play in aggregate ﬂuctuations.21
The growth accounting exercise requires data on Yt, Kt, Et, and ht to compute TFP for the UK
from 1916 to 1938. We obtain UK output and capital from Feinstein (1972) and Mitchell (1988). Section
2.2 discusses the UK employment and population data needed to calculate Et as well as construction
of ht. We measure Yt and Kt per capita in constant 1913 pounds. The appendix summarizes the data,
which appears in table A4. The TFP residual is computed by applying the log operator to the production
function (1) and rearranging terms to obtain lnZt and its growth rate, 
Z;t ( lnZt   lnZt 1).
20The similarity in these basic sample statistics is carried over to the interwar 1920–1938 and shorter interwar 1925–1938
samples as shown in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix.
21Cole and Ohanian (2002a) employ the CRS technology ht KtZt Nt1   K
t Zt Et1 ht in a growth accounting
exercise. Their technology equates the workweeks of Et and Kt. The production function (1) holds the capital utilization rate
ﬁxed which avoid this restriction.
12The results of the growth accounting exercise are found in table 4. This table contains sam-
ple statistics for the 1916–1938, 1920–1938, and 1925–1938 samples in its top, middle, and bottom
panels. We study these samples to gauge the robustness of the growth accounting exercise across
the McKenna rule regime and interwar samples. The 1925–1938 sample is included to examine the
impact of excluding the ‘transwar’ period on interwar UK economic outcomes. On these samples, ta-
ble 4 reports the sample mean 




ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient b 
X1 of the growth rates 
X;t, Xt  Yt, Kt, Nt, and Zt.
The sample means of 
Z and 
K exhibit little change across the three samples. Table 4 shows
that 
Z is about 1 percent no matter the sample. Likewise, 
K changes by only 0.2 percent from the
longest sample to the two interwar samples.
There are larger shifts in 
Y and 
N moving from the McKenna rule regime to the interwar
samples. Output growth increases from 0.6 to 1 percent by ignoring the 1916–1919 observations and
rises to 1.7 percent after dropping the ‘transwar’ period. Much of the increase in 
Y is generated by

N moving from negative, to zero, to about 1.4 percent as the World War I and early interwar years are
eliminated from the samples.
Table 4 shows there is little change in volatility, b 






Z on the 1916–1938 and 1920–1938 samples. Across these samples, b 
N and b 
Z are close and about
50 percent larger than b 
Y and b 
K. Persistence is similar on the McKenna rule and 1920-1938 samples
with small positive b 
;Y1, slightly negative b 
;K1 and b 
;Z1, and near zero b 
;N1.
The 1925–1938 sample sees some shifts in b 
 and b 
1. The bottom panel of table 4 contains
smaller b 
 for output, capital, labor, and TFP compared with those from the longer samples. The
ﬁrst-order serial correlation coeﬃcient, b 
X1, of output, capital, and labor growth switch signs on
the 1925–1938 sample compared to longer samples. This statistic exhibits small negative b 
X1 for
output growth, while the same statistics for 
K, and 
N are positive. TFP growth, 
Z, becomes more
negatively serially correlated on the 1925–1938 sample.
Figure 3 plots the results of the growth accounting exercise for the UK from 1916 to 1938.
The top row of windows in ﬁgure 3 gives two perspectives on movements in Yt, Kt, and Nt. Growth
rates appear in the top left window of ﬁgure 3. We report a low frequency or trend measure in the top
right window, which is ÐX;t  lnXt   lnX1916, Xt  Yt, Kt, Nt, and t  1916;:::;1938. The top row of
windows of ﬁgure 3 depict these growth rates of Yt, Kt, and Nt plots with (blue) solid, (red) dashed,
and (green) dotted lines, respectively.
13The volatility message of table 4 is reinforced by the plots of 
Y;t, 
K;t, and 
N;t in the top left
window of ﬁgure 3. These plots are visual evidence that 
Y;t, 
K;t, and 
N;t are more volatile from
1916 to 1922 than during the 1923–1938 period.
The top right window of ﬁgure 3 focuses attention on lower frequency movements in Yt, Kt,
and Nt. Lower frequency ﬂuctuations appear as peaks and troughs in long-run growth paths. For
example, plots of ÐY;t and ÐN;t peak in 1918 followed by a steep drop. The cumulative loss in Yt is over
22 percent by 1921 and for Nt it is more than 40 percent by 1922. The path ÐK;t takes sees it rise at
ﬁrst during World War I and then fall before peaking with a cumulative gain of almost 13 percent in
1920. From the mid-1920s to 1938, there is growth in ÐY;t, ÐK;t, and ÐN;t with the late 1920s and early
1930s being the only major exception.
The growth and trend growth rates of TFP are displayed in the bottom row of windows in ﬁgure
3. These plots reveal that the UK had a productivity boom toward the end of World War I. However,
the bottom left window of ﬁgure 3 shows 
Z;1919   0:5 percent and 
Z;1920   20:1 percent, which
indicates that the fall in UK TFP subsequent to World War I turned into a collapse by 1920. There is an
immediate recovery in TFP the next year, 
Z;1921  18.9 percent, but there are ﬁve years in which 
Z;t
is negative, from 1925 to 1938 (i.e., 1927, 1932, 1934, 1937, and 1938), and that average  1:5 percent.
Nonetheless, the average of 
Z;t is 3.3 percent after 1925, given 
Z;t > 0. This helps to explain the
economic recovery of the mid-1920s and the reduced volatility of 
Z  3.4 percent on the 1925–1938
sample compared with 
Z of 6.8 percent and 7.4 percent on the 1920–1938 and 1916–1938 samples.
The bottom right window of ﬁgure 3 maps 
Z;t into ÐZ;t. This trend measure of TFP appears in
the bottom right window of ﬁgure 3. In this window, ÐZ;t depicts a peak in TFP during World War I, its
steep post-war decline, and a recovery in TFP that levels oﬀ by 1925. Similar evidence is reported by
Bienefeld (1972); Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982); and Broadberry (1986, 1990). Nonethe-
less, we close this section by noting that, without the uninterrupted hours worked series ht, it is not
possible to observe that the collapse in TFP from 1919 to 1921 was wedged between a small boom
during World War I and a recovery beginning in 1922.22
3.2 The Benjamin-Kochin Regression Revisited
Benjamin and Kochin (1979, 1982) contend that generous unemployment insurance beneﬁts
produced a higher UK unemployment rate, URt, in the interwar period. Their analysis relies on an ordi-
22Table A3 reports moments of a growth accounting exercise that relies on hAlt;t. This growth accounting exercise produces
TFP growth and its accumulated growth path displayed in ﬁgure A1 from 1916 to 1938. Given Ñlnht and ÑlnhAlt;t yield
similar moments, it is not surprising that replacing ht with hAlt;t yields similar predictions for UK TFP from 1916 to 1938.
14nary least squares (OLS) regression of the URt on the ratio of beneﬁts to wages, the replacement ratio
RRt, detrended log real net national product, yt, and a constant. The appendix discusses construction
of URt, RRt, and yt. Table A5 lists the series.
We refer to regressing the URt on a constant, the RRt, and yt as the BK regression. The BK
hypothesis is that there is a positive, economically large, and statistically signiﬁcant response of URt
to RRt. On the McKenna rule sample of 1916–1938, the estimated BK regression is
URt  1:12  23:55 RRt   26:83 yt;
1:77 4:04 6:44
(2)
with standard errors in parentheses, and the standard deviation of the regression residuals is 3.05.
There is solace for Benjamin and Kochin (1979, 1982) in these estimates because the elasticity of URt
with respect to RRt is 0.90 at the sample means.
This section studies the robustness of the BK regression and hypothesis with Bayesian model
averaging (BMA) methods. The robustness issues are addressed by modifying the BK regression to
include diﬀerent combinations of K;t, N;t, and C;t on the McKenna rule sample of 1916 to 1938.
Our motivation is that DSGE models with capital income, labor income, and consumption taxes predict
that these ﬁscal instruments distort labor supply-demand decisions as well as aﬀecting choices over
consumption and saving. According to Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994), these distortions have an
impact on business cycle ﬂuctuations. This suggests adding K;t, N;t, and C;t to the BK regression to
assess the impact on the UK unemployment rate from 1916 to 1938. Thus, we also exploit K;t, N;t,
and C;t to study the impact of model uncertainty over which variables should be explanatory variables
for the UK unemployment rate.
There is a tradition that views the BK regression as misspeciﬁed.23 However, misspeciﬁcation
of the BK regression is not relevant for our Bayesian model averaging (BMA) exercise analysis. The BMA
exercise provides evidence about model uncertainty over the BK regression and several alternatives
conditional on the data rather than which regression speciﬁcation is or is not correct.
We employ BMA to study the uncertainty of the BK regression and the impact, if any, on the
BK hypothesis. Uncertainty about the BK regression is assessed by adding K;t, N;t, and C;t one at a
23The structural interpretation BK give to their regression has generated much debate. Critiques of the BK regression focus
on: a measurement of aggregate UK unemployment and the extent of unemployment insurance coverage across industries
and trades classiﬁcation [Cross (1982); Metcalf, Nickell, and Floros (1982); Eichengreen (1987); Hatton and Bailey (2002); and
Hatton (2005)]; b long-term change in UK industrial structure [Collins (1982), Garside (1990), Loungani (1991), and Cole and
Ohanian (2002a)]; and c small sample issues [Cross (1982) and Ormerod and Worswick (1982)]. Benjamin and Kochin (1982)
reply to these critiques.
15time and in various groups to the BK regression. The most general alternative to the BK regression is
URt  0  RRRRt  yyt  KK;t  NN;t  CC;t  et; (3)
where et is a mean zero error term with homoscedastic variance, 2
e . Figure 4 plots the right- and
left-hand side variables of regression (3) from 1916 to 1938. The variables URt, RRt, yt, K;t, N;t,
and C;t are denoted as a solid line with diamonds, a solid line with stars, a solid line with squares, a
plain solid line, a dashed line, and a dotted line, respectively. A striking feature of ﬁgure 4 is that the
paths of RRt and K;t appear to move together through the sample.
Regression (3) is one of seven models we estimate. The remaining six regressions are formed by
estimating three models with two of the three tax rates and three models with only one of the three tax
rates. We call the seven models modiﬁed BK regressions and label these M1; :::; M7, where regression
(3)isM7. TheBMAexerciseaddssevenmoreregressionsthatareidenticalto M1; :::; M7 exceptthatRR
 0. These regressions are labeled M1;R; :::; M7;R. The model space M 
n
M1; M1;R; :::; M7; M7;R
o
contains the 14 regressions. Levels regressions appear in M to be consistent with Benjamin and Kochin
(1979).
Table 5 reports OLS estimates of M on the 1916–1938 sample. These estimates suggest uncer-
tainty about the regressions in M. However, it should not be a surprise that M7 and M7;R produce the
smallest (and nearly identical) estimates of e.
Uncertainty about the regression speciﬁcations is tied to fragility of the BK hypothesis, RR
 0 across M1; :::; M7. There are three modiﬁed BK regressions, M2, M3, and M6, that produce b RR
> 0 with t ratios greater than two. These modiﬁed BK regressions include N;t and C;t, but K;t is
absent. There is less support for the BK hypothesis when K;t appears in the modiﬁed BK regressions
M1, M4, M5, and M7. These modiﬁed BK regressions yield b RR that are small compared with b RR 
23.5 reported by the estimated BK regression (2). Thus, the BK hypothesis appears to be compromised
by adding K;t to the BK regression.24
The modiﬁed BK regressions in the model space M are a platform for gauging the vulnerability
of the BK hypothesis. Although standard t ratios might suggest that adding K;t negates the BK hy-
pothesis, we do not take that position. Instead, we view the OLS estimates and standard errors of table
5 as evidence that there is substantial uncertainty across the 14 regressions
n
M1; M1;R; :::; M7; M7;R
o
.
24Nason and Vahey (2006) report Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov chain estimates for the BK regression with K;t, N;t, and
C;t and obtain qualitatively similar results for the BK hypothesis.
16By ignoring this uncertainty, a researcher may overstate the precision of estimated coeﬃcients and
place insuﬃcient concern on the fragility of the hypothesis under review.
The goal of the BMA exercise is to compute the posterior model probability that RRt should
be excluded from the modiﬁed BK regressions M1; :::; M7. The BMA procedure exploits rules of con-
ditional probability to compute this probability for inferences about the parameter of interest, RR.






for the BK regression, where D 
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where BICi  b Li   0:5ki lnT, b Li is the log likelihood function computed at the maximum likelihood
estimates (i.e., OLS) of Mi, ki is the number of parameters in Mi, and T  23 is the sample size.
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is the probability that RRt has no predictive content for URt conditional on
D and Mi. The noninformative prior requires the probability that RRt is excluded from or excluded in


















; i  1;:::;7; (6)




  D; Mi

relies on posterior model probabilities of the ith restricted and unrestricted mod-
iﬁed BK regressions.






of (5). It is computed using the conditional probability (6), weighted by the posterior






 0.79, while it is 0.67 on the interwar 1920–1938 sample. Thus, the probability that
RRt has predictive content for URt is 21 percent and 33 percent on the 1916–1938 and 1920–1938
samples, respectively. These probabilities are well short of the 99 percent signiﬁcance claimed by
Benjamin and Kochin (1979, 1982). We conclude there is little support for the BK hypothesis that the
RRt contributes to variation in URt based on uncertainty about the BK regression speciﬁcation during
the McKenna rule and interwar samples.
4. Conclusion
This paper ﬁlls in gaps in the World War I and interwar UK time series. We tabulate time series
of ex post UK average capital income, labor income, and consumption tax rates and per capita hours
worked from 1913 to 1938. Details about data sources and construction methods are discussed in the
ﬁrst part of the paper.
The rest of the paper displays some of the uses to which the UK average tax rates and per
capita hours worked time series can be put. We test for a unit root in the average tax rates and report
sample statistics of the average labor income tax rates, ﬁrst diﬀerences of the average capital income
and consumption tax rates, and the growth rates of our preferred and alternative per capita hours
worked. The paper also reports growth accounting exercises for the UK on 1916–1938, 1920–1938,
and 1925–1938 samples as well as Bayesian model averaging experiments to examine the robustness
of the Benjamin and Kochin (1979) regression and hypothesis on 1916–1938 and 1920–38 samples.
The results point future research in several new directions. For example a unit root is rejected
for the average labor income tax rate on the 1916–1938 sample, but not for the average capital income
and consumption tax rates. Optimal tax theory predicts that the labor income tax rate is stationary
when ﬁnancial markets are complete, but not when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete. Although Scott
(2007) shows that the optimality of tax policy cannot be evaluated with unit root tests, it is the case
that UK ﬁnancial markets were far from complete during World War I and the interwar period. Further,
Daunton (2002) argues that UK ﬁscal policy followed the McKenna rule dictum and relied on capital
18income taxation to achieve the goals of UK ﬁscal policy from 1916 to 1938. Nason and Vahey (2007)
provide evidence that the McKenna rule had an adverse eﬀect on the UK economy. This suggests there
is a gap to be ﬁlled by research that uses the benchmark of optimal tax theory to assess the impact of
the McKenna rule on the UK economy.
The UK growth accounting exercise ﬁnds that capital and total factor productivity growth sup-
ported positive average output growth in the face of negative average total hours worked growth during
the McKenna rule sample of 1916 to 1938. These results are consistent with Cole and Ohanian (2002a)
who report a growth accounting exercise that shows a drop in labor input growth that coincides with
low average UK output growth during the interwar period. However these results also leave unexplained
why capital grew during the interwar period, which contributed to output growth, when the McKenna
rule regime aimed to tax capital heavily.
We also study the Benjamin and Kochin (1979) hypothesis that contends that the generosity of
unemployment beneﬁts spurred a rise in the unemployment rate in the UK during the interwar period.
Bayesian model averaging is employed to examine the uncertainty of the Benjamin and Kochin hypothe-
sis on the McKenna rule sample of 1916 to 1938 and the interwar 1920–1938 sample by adding various
combinations of the average capital income, labor income, and consumption tax rates to the Benjamin
and Kochin regression. The Bayesian model averaging experiments expose the lack of robustness in
the Benjamin and Kochin hypothesis on the McKenna rule and interwar samples. Although questions
about the high interwar UK unemployment rate have not been fully answered, Nason and Vahey (2007)
suggest that the ﬁscal stringency of the McKenna rule may have been a contributing factor.
Our view is that the growth accounting exercise and applying Bayesian model averaging to
the Benjamin and Kochin regression raise more questions about the impact of ﬁscal policy on the UK
economy during World War I and the interwar period. Future analysis of these data using Keynesian
and non-Keynesian theories and models will yield more insight into the UK economy from World War I
through the interwar period. Although these questions are left for future research, Cole and Ohanian
(2002a, 2002b) and Nason and Vahey (2007) are good starting points.
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21Table 1: UK Per Capita Hours Worked
and Average Tax Rates, 1913–1938
K;t N;t C;t EPD;t ht hAlt;t
1913 0.0538 0.0388 0.0444 – 1175.0249 1175.0249
1914 0.0601 0.0389 0.0434 – 1158.8584 1158.8584
1915 0.0510 0.0527 0.0529 – 1185.3950 1185.3950
1916 0.0390 0.0700 0.0577 0.1314 1195.8753 1195.8753
1917 0.0345 0.0982 0.0453 0.2185 1199.1299 1199.1299
1918 0.0304 0.0910 0.0469 0.2669 1205.3611 1205.3611
1919 0.0339 0.1106 0.0611 0.2557 1022.0481 1022.0481
1920 0.0934 0.0971 0.0665 0.2539 1040.8534 1033.9975
1921 0.2641 0.1069 0.0795 0.1527 908.6391 902.9199
1922 0.2263 0.1277 0.0862 0.0382 898.5255 895.8317
1923 0.2011 0.1139 0.0842 0.0309 903.2405 900.8096
1924 0.1756 0.1094 0.0750 0.0255 907.9546 907.6109
1925 0.1708 0.1058 0.0745 0.0172 917.7429 913.2181
1926 0.1884 0.0980 0.0764 0.0081 916.8186 920.9116
1927 0.1913 0.0882 0.0795 0.0013 942.7299 944.5279
1928 0.1794 0.0913 0.0815 – 944.5552 943.9537
1929 0.1774 0.0896 0.0796 – 958.5370 950.7702
1930 0.2179 0.0938 0.0783 – 939.0188 929.9814
1931 0.2286 0.1108 0.0820 – 915.0793 905.7857
1932 0.2491 0.1222 0.0945 – 916.5186 904.9300
1933 0.2295 0.1057 0.0936 – 933.8593 919.7395
1934 0.1696 0.0977 0.0960 – 960.0468 971.5686
1935 0.1748 0.0889 0.0948 – 975.4359 983.7007
1936 0.1505 0.0842 0.0971 – 1004.1981 1009.1812
1937 0.1423 0.0908 0.0963 – 1035.9207 1035.3738
1938 0.1604 0.0987 0.0945 – 1036.6234 1032.4780
The average capital income, labor income, consumption, and excess proﬁts duty (EPD) tax rates are denoted K;t, N;t, C;t,
and EPD;t, respectively. Per capita hours worked is represented by ht and the alternative series hAlt;t. The former series is
computed by the authors as discussed in the text. The alternative per capita hours worked series, halt;t, is based on weekly
hours indices from the Ministry of Labour Monthly Gazette (September 1957) on samples from 1920 to 1933 and 1934 to 1939
samples. The text also discusses the calculations used to generate hAlt;t.
22Table 2: Dickey-Fuller Regressions of
UK Average Tax Rates, 1916–1938
DF: i;t  i  ii;t 1  i;t; i  K; N; C; T  23:
K;t N;t C;t
b  0.040 0.049 0.011
(0.021) (0.013) (0.006)
b  0.774 0.516 0.887
(0.115) (0.127) (0.079)
b  0.040 0.010 0.006
DF t-ratio  1:970  3:811  1:430
b MU 0.849 – 1.022
[0.553 1.088] – [0.737 1.123]
The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). OLS standard errors appear in parentheses. The DF t-ratio
has MacKinnon (1996) ﬁnite-sample 1, 5, and 10 percent critical values of  3:753,  2:998, and  2:639, respectively. The
brackets contain lower and upper values of 90 percent conﬁdence intervals of the Andrews and Chen (1994) approximate
median-unbiased estimates of the ﬁrst-order autoregressive coeﬃcient, b MU.
Table 3: Sample Statistics of UK Average Tax
Rates and Per Capita Hours Worked, 1916–1938
ÑK N ÑC Ñlnh ÑlnhAlt
X 0.005 0.100 0.002  0:006  0:006
b X 0.043 0.013 0.006 0.048 0.049
XMax 0.171 0.128 0.014 0.031 0.055
XMin  0:060 0.070  0:012  0:165  0:165
b X1 0.148 0.646 0.189  0:051  0:040
The sample mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient are denoted by X, b X,
XMax, XMin, and b X1, respectively.
23Table 4: UK World War I and Interwar
Growth Accounting Summary Statistics
Sample Y K N Z
1916–1938

 0.006 0.009  0:006 0.010
b 
 0.046 0.047 0.076 0.068

Max 0.074 0.141 0.060 0.189

Min  0:103  0:115  0:269  0:201
b 
1 0.220  0:185  0:034  0:246
1920–1938

 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.010
b 
 0.043 0.046 0.073 0.074

Max 0.074 0.141 0.060 0.189

Min  0:093  0:115  0:269  0:201
b 
1 0.300  0:233  0:025  0:245
1925–1938

 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.004
b 
 0.036 0.020 0.036 0.034

Max 0.074 0.054 0.060 0.052

Min  0:057  0:013  0:054  0:063
b 
1  0:038 0:184 0:335  0:373





Min, and b 
1, respectively.
24Table 5: Modiﬁed BK Regressions, 1916–1938
Dependent Variable: UK Unemployment Rate, URt
b 0 b RR b y b K b N b C b e
M1  3:73 6.62 6.46 77.59 – – 2.28
(1.74) (5.37) (9.18) (18.21)
M1;R  4:03 – 13.78 96.14 – – 2.36
(1.78) (7.21) (10.57)
M2  12:28 26.70  15:82 – 129.82 – 2.79
(6.51) (3.73) (7.84) (61.09)
M2;R 4.91 –  29:09 – 66.72 – 5.01
(10.86) (13.68) (108.55)
M3  6:06 14.35  22:30 – – 148.45 2.86
(4.37) (7.36) (6.56) (83.66)
M3;R  11:26 –  19:17 – – 288.22 3.09
(3.73) (6.86) (46.46)
M4  13:48 8.89 12.29 71.82 97.95 – 2.09
(4.88) (5.03) (8.84) (16.88) (46.31)
M4;R  12:13 – 20.65 96.63 80.47 – 2.23
(5.13) (7.96) (9.98) (48.21)
M5  9:60  2:13 9.04 74.69 – 125.21 2.10
(3.30) (6.56) (8.54) (16.83) (61.62)
M5;R  8:93 – 7.43 71.60 – 112.10 2.11
(2.58) (6.97) (13.90) (46.60)
M6  17:71 16.58  12:57 – 120.18 132.92 2.63
(6.89) (6.84) (7.62) (57.76) (77.11)
M6;R  21:45 –  10:83 – 98.22 293.31 2.94
(7.52) (8.50) (63.91) (44.36)
M7  18:14 0.68 14.23 69.58 90.60 115.09 1.92
(5.04) (6.14) (8.19) (15.58) (42.79) (56.57)
M7;R  18:25 – 14.66 70.58 89.57 119.23 1.92
(4.95) (7.20) (12.70) (41.79) (42.68)
Mnemonics 0, RR, y, b e, K, N, and C denote the intercept, replacement ratio, linear detrended log net national product,
standard deviation of regression residuals, and average capital income, labor income, and consumption tax rates, respectively.
Models M1, :::; M7 (M1;R, :::; M7;R) are modiﬁed BK regressions that include diﬀerent combinations of K;t, N;t, and C;t,
and (exclude) RRt. The regressions are estimated by OLS on the 1916–1938 sample, T  23. Parentheses contain OLS standard
errors.
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Fig. 4: Unemployment Rate, Replacement Ratio, Detrended Output,













This appendix describes the sources and construction of the income growth accounting and Benjamin
and Kochin (1979) regression time series. Tables A2, A3, and A4 and ﬁgure A1 are also found below.
A.1 UK Growth Accounting Data
Feinstein (1972) and Mitchell (1988) are the primary sources of our UK national income, tangible
capital stock, per capita hours worked, and employment data. We obtain nominal national income from
the “Compromise GDP” measure reported in Feinstein (1972, T12–T13). This nominal GDP series is in
millions of current pounds at factor cost. The series is revised and extended by Mitchell (1988, p.
836). A real GDP index is reported by Feinstein (1972, T19) on a “compromise” basis with 1913 as the
base year. Mitchell (1988, p. 836) revises and extends the nominal GDP and real GDP index. Our real
output series is calculated by scaling the real GDP index with the 1913 nominal GDP observation. The
real capital stock equals the net capital stock in millions of current pounds found in Mitchell (1988,
pp. 865–866), scaled up by the inverse of one minus a ﬁxed depreciation rate (equal to 0.109), and
adjusted to the 1913 base year using the implied “compromise GDP” deﬂator. As discussed in section
2.2, per capita hours worked relies on the sum of civilian and armed services employment to measure
total employment. The employment series are available in Feinstein (T126–7) measured in thousands
of workers. These time series are presented in table A1.
A.2 Benjamin and Kochin (1979) Regression Data
This appendix describes the Benjamin and Kochin (1979) regression variables. Table A5 lists
the data.
Benjamin and Kochin’s unemployment rate series is found in Ormerod and Worswick (1982,
table 1) from 1920 to 1938, which is taken from Feinstein (1972, T128). He provides unemployment
rate data that are based on those workers covered by unemployment insurance. The 1919 observation
is also given by Feinstein (1972, T126), whose data sources are trade union records. Mitchell (1988, p.
124) reports additional observations for the 1913–1918 period using similar sources and deﬁnitions.
The 1913–1918, 1919, and 1920–1938 data are combined to obtain the unemployment rate, URt.
Ormerod and Worswick (1982) provide the replacement ratio series. Benjamin and Kochin
calculate the series using average weekly wages of full-time employees from Chapman (1953) and
beneﬁt entitlements of an adult male with a spouse and two children from Burns (1941, table XI, p.
368). Beneﬁts data prior to 1920 are also from Burns, but average weekly wages are from Feinstein
(1972, T140) rather than Chapman. The pre-1920 data and Benjamin and Kochin’s preferred series are
spliced together to form the replacement ratio, RRt, that this paper employs.
Benjamin and Kochin’s output series is also found in Ormerod and Worswick (1982). They use
A1real net national product in millions of 1938 pounds at factor cost that is available from Feinstein
(1972, T15). This source also supplies observations from 1913 to 1919. Note that real net national
product is not per capita. Subsequent to taking the log of real net national product from 1916 to 1938,
it is regressed on an intercept and time trend. The regression residuals form yt. The same procedure
is used to create yt on the 1920–1938 sample.
We use Benjamin and Kochin’s preferred series in the regressions. This avoids issues of com-
paring our results to Benjamin and Kochin’s and measurement problems discussed in the economic
history literature. Nason and Vahey (2006) provide a summary and references of these problems. We
experimented with alternative measures of URt, yt, and RRt that have been discussed in the litera-
ture. Our empirical results are robust across the alternative variable measures. Although there are a
few diﬀerences in the levels across alternative variable measures, these variables exhibit qualitatively
similar comovement with the URt in the 1920–1938 sample.
A2Table A1: Sample Statistics of UK Average Tax
Rates and Per Capita Hours Worked, 1920–1938
ÑK N ÑC Ñlnh ÑlnhAlt
X 0.007 0.101 0.002 0.007 0.005
b X 0.048 0.012 0.005 0.037 0.038
XMax 0.171 0.128 0.013 0.031 0.055
XMin  0:060 0.084  0:010  0:136  0:136
b X1 0.138 0.605 0.336  0:035 0.007
The sample mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient are denoted by X, b X,
XMax, XMin, and b X1, respectively.
Table A2: Sample Statistics of UK Average Tax
Rates and Per Capita Hours Worked, 1925–1938
ÑK N ÑC Ñlnh ÑlnhAlt
X  0:001 0.098 0.001 0.010 0.009
b X 0.024 0.010 0.004 0.018 0.021
XMax 0.040 0.122 0.012 0.031 0.055
XMin  0:060 0.084  0:002  0:026  0:026
b X1 0.127 0.613 0.063 0.333 0.400
The sample mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient are denoted by X, b X,
XMax, XMin, and b X1, respectively.
A3Table A3: UK World War I and Interwar
Growth Accounting Summary Statistics,
Based on hAlt;t
Sample Y K N Z
1916–1938

 0.006 0.009  0:006 0.010
b 
 0.046 0.047 0.076 0.067

Max 0.074 0.141 0.080 0.188

Min  0:103  0:115  0:269  0:195
b 
1 0.220  0:185  0:008  0:262
1920–1938

 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.010
b 
 0.044 0.046 0.073 0.073

Max 0.074 0.141 0.080 0.188

Min  0:093  0:115  0:269  0:195
b 
1 0.300  0:233 0:005  0:262
1925–1938

 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.004
b 
 0.036 0.020 0.038 0.035

Max 0.074 0.054 0.080 0.056

Min  0:057  0:013  0:055  0:072
b 
1  0:038 0:184 0:370  0:440





Min, and b 
1, respectively.
A4Table A4: UK GDP, Capital, Employment,
and Population, 1913–1938
Nominal Real GDP Net Capital Civilian Military
GDP Index Stock Employment Employment Population
1913 2244.0 100.0 4565.0 19910.0 400.0 45649.0
1914 2278.0 102.3 4642.0 19440.0 810.0 46049.0
1915 2746.0 108.8 5298.0 18400.0 2490.0 46340.0
1916 3218.0 110.9 6131.0 17700.0 3500.0 46514.0
1917 4082.0 111.7 7112.0 17100.0 4250.0 46614.0
1918 4920.0 114.1 8588.0 17060.0 4430.0 46575.0
1919 5202.0 102.8 10558.0 19030.0 2130.0 46534.0
1920 5439.0 91.3 13440.0 19537.0 760.0 43718.0
1921 4578.0 83.9 11060.0 17417.0 491.0 44072.0
1922 3995.0 88.2 9230.0 17483.0 392.0 44372.0
1923 3793.0 91.0 8510.0 17758.0 348.0 44596.0
1924 3877.0 94.8 8610.0 18032.0 346.0 44915.0
1925 4113.0 99.4 8700.0 18238.0 350.0 45059.0
1926 3870.0 95.7 8590.0 18244.0 349.0 45232.0
1927 4079.0 103.4 8560.0 18789.0 347.0 45389.0
1928 4103.0 104.7 8460.0 18868.0 336.0 45578.0
1929 4214.0 107.8 8660.0 19146.0 333.0 45672.0
1930 4185.0 107.0 8590.0 18788.0 327.0 45866.0
1931 3843.0 101.5 8410.0 18340.0 325.0 46074.0
1932 3746.0 102.3 8130.0 18430.0 323.0 46335.0
1933 3776.0 105.3 8080.0 18813.0 323.0 46520.0
1934 4016.0 112.2 8220.0 19360.0 325.0 46666.0
1935 4197.0 116.5 8560.0 19704.0 333.0 46868.0
1936 4389.0 121.8 9080.0 20321.0 349.0 47081.0
1937 4708.0 126.1 9860.0 20987.0 377.0 47289.0
1938 4959.0 127.6 10230.0 20986.0 432.0 47494.0
Nominal GDP is in millions of current year pounds, at factor prices. The net capital stock is also measured in millions of current
year pounds. Civilian employment, military employment, and population are in thousands of workers, military personnel,
and people. Appendix A.1 contains details about the GDP, capital, civilian and military employment, and population data.
A5Table A5: UK Unemployment Rate,
Replacement Rate, and Real Net National Product,
1913–1938
Unemployment Replacement Real Net
Rate Rate National Product
1913 3.60 19.80 4085
1914 4.20 19.68 4118
1915 1.20 17.91 4469
1916 0.60 16.43 4515
1917 0.70 13.85 4579
1918 0.80 11.75 4492
1919 3.40 10.58 3954
1920 3.90 15.31 3426
1921 16.90 23.84 3242
1922 14.30 37.23 3384
1923 11.70 39.64 3514
1924 10.30 42.27 3622
1925 11.30 47.87 3840
1926 12.50 48.39 3656
1927 9.70 48.04 3937
1928 10.80 49.68 4003
1929 10.40 50.18 4097
1930 16.10 52.96 4082
1931 21.30 53.81 3832
1932 22.10 50.46 3828
1933 19.90 50.74 3899
1934 16.70 52.67 4196
1935 15.50 55.09 4365
1936 13.10 57.04 4498
1937 10.80 55.94 4665
1938 12.90 55.60 4807
The UK unemployment and replacement rates are in percentages. Real net national product is in millions of 1938 pounds
at factor cost. Appendix A.2 discusses the sources of the unemployment rate (URt) and replacement rate (RRt), along with
estimating linear detrended output (yt) as the residual of log real net national product on an intercept and time trend.
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Fig. A1: U.K. WWI and Interwar Productivity Accounting, 1916-1938
 Γ
K
 Γ
N
 Γ
Y
 γ
N
γ
Y
 γ
K